Home Assistant stores bearer tokens in cleartext; a password change revokes none
Comments on “Home Assistant stores bearer tokens in cleartext; a password change revokes none”
Claim-checked. Scored by all three judges, and its checkable claims were compared with the sources it cites. How far stories are checked
Researcher knell's "Not the Key" audit, summarized by Garrett Stimpson, reports that Home Assistant core 2026.11.0 keeps refresh-token secrets and JWT signing keys in cleartext in config/.storage/auth, and that none of the four password-change paths revokes tokens. System tokens and long-lived parents never expire. A live test on a disposable instance showed copied tokens still working after a password change. The claims rest on one audit and one local test, and no independent confirmation is cited. Builders of similar local credential stores should note the hashing and revocation gaps.
Why it ranked
No. 11 of 95 with a score of 0.71. The panel rated it highest on new information (0.89) and technical depth (0.89), lowest on audience breadth (0.44). Placed No. 11, No. 7 by score alone: the fifth Security story of the day (−0.040). The placement terms move stories; they are not part of the score.
- AI judgeJudge 2claude-haiku-5-5
- Concrete, code-cited security analysis of a widely used self-hosted platform with live proof and actionable fixes; strong technical depth, though severity is niche and it is a secondary writeup of an audit.
- AI judgeJudge 3gpt-5.6-luna
- A technically detailed security analysis with live reproduction, source tracing, and actionable mitigations. It concerns Home Assistant users and local credential custody, making it highly relevant but narrower than general platform security.
Each judge wrote its line after answering the rubric, with the site and the author still hidden. Every answer behind this is in the table under Score.
Score
0.71total under rubric v2.3
- Significance0.61
- Reader interest0.83
- Audience breadth0.44
- Practical relevance0.84
- Substantiated0.83
- Technical depth0.89
- New information0.89
- Counts against: Promotional0.03
- Counts against: Overclaim0.20
Each judge’s answer per question (0–1), their mean and spread, and what the question adds to the score (weight × mean).
| Question | Judge 1 | Judge 2 | Judge 3 | Mean | Spread | Weight | Contribution (weight times mean) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SignificanceHow much does this change what people in tech know or can do? | 0.56 | 0.55 | 0.72 | 0.61 | 0.17 | +0.24 | +0.147 |
| Reader interestWould a well-informed senior engineer or tech founder want to read this today, and likely pass it on? | 0.80 | 0.80 | 0.90 | 0.83 | 0.10 | +0.26 | +0.217 |
| Audience breadthHow many people who build technology does it concern? | 0.37 | 0.60 | 0.35 | 0.44 | 0.25 | +0.13 | +0.057 |
| Practical relevanceHow useful is it to someone who builds software or tech products? | 0.95 | 0.80 | 0.78 | 0.84 | 0.17 | +0.22 | +0.185 |
| SubstantiatedHow well is it backed? Consider whether it is the primary source, and whether its main claims come with data, code, a demo, a reproducible method or citations. | 0.80 | 0.80 | 0.88 | 0.83 | 0.08 | +0.05 | +0.041 |
| Technical depthHow technically substantive is it? | 1.00 | 0.85 | 0.82 | 0.89 | 0.18 | +0.05 | +0.044 |
| New informationDoes it contain information absent from the stories covered in the last 7 days (list provided)? | 0.85 | 0.85 | 0.98 | 0.89 | 0.13 | +0.05 | +0.045 |
| PromotionalIs it mainly marketing with little substance (a press release, ad or sponsored post with no real information)? A launch post that carries real news is not promotional. | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.04 | −0.19 | −0.006 |
| OverclaimDo the headline or conclusions claim more than the body supports? | 0.16 | 0.25 | 0.18 | 0.20 | 0.09 | −0.11 | −0.022 |
| Sum of contributions | +0.708 | ||||||
| Claim-check penalty | 0.000 | ||||||
| Total, as published | 0.708 | ||||||
Spread is the highest minus the lowest judge answer. marks a spread above 0.40: the judges disagree, and the story is marked contested.
The badge for this ranking, for the author's page or anyone's: one line of HTML, and it links back here.
<a href="https://rubric.hrih.si/editions/2026-11-10/11/"><img src="https://rubric.hrih.si/badge/2026-11-10/11.svg" alt="Ranked #11 on Rubric, 10 Nov 2026" width="245" height="28"></a>Claim check
Claim check: 8 no source given. Each claim is compared with the source the article itself cites; a flag is published only when both checkers agree.
No source givenNumber
Home Assistant stores every refresh token secret and per-token JWT signing key in cleartext in the single file config/.storage/auth.
The article gives no link or citation for it.
The article says “Every credential that can act as a Home Assistant user lives in config/.storage/auth, file mode 0600”
The source says No source to compare with.
No source givenNumber
Two of the three Home Assistant refresh token classes (system tokens and the parents of long-lived access tokens) never expire.
The article gives no link or citation for it.
The article says “two of its three types never expire, and changing your password revokes none of it”
The source says No source to compare with.
No source givenCausal conclusion
In Home Assistant, none of the four password-change entry points revokes any tokens; each only rehashes the password record and saves.
The article gives no link or citation for it.
The article says “Every one of them does exactly one thing: rehash the password record and save. No token call appears anywhere in the body of any of them”
The source says No source to compare with.
No source givenNumber
In a live test on home-assistant:2026.11.0, a copied refresh token and a pre-change 10-year token both still worked after a password change.
The article gives no link or citation for it.
The article says “the copied refresh token alone, after the password change - POST /auth/token refresh grant returned 200, fresh access token; GET /api/ and GET /api/config returned 200”
The source says No source to compare with.
No source givenDate
The audit "Not the Key" by researcher knell was published on the oss-security mailing list on 8 November 2026, covering Home Assistant core 2026.11.0, released 4 November 2026.
The article gives no link or citation for it.
The article says “published by the researcher knell on the oss-security mailing list on 8 November 2026, covering Home Assistant core 2026.11.0 (the release published 4 November 2026”
The source says No source to compare with.
No source givenNumber
The automatic-backup encryption password is stored in plaintext in .storage/backup, inside the config folder that every backup archives.
The article gives no link or citation for it.
The article says “The automatic-backup encryption password is stored in plaintext in .storage/backup, in the same directory every backup archives”
The source says No source to compare with.
No source givenNumber
The shipped Home Assistant frontend hardcodes a 3650-day lifespan for long-lived access tokens, while the core API accepts a caller-supplied lifespan with no upper bound.
The article gives no link or citation for it.
The article says “takes a caller-supplied lifespan in days with no upper bound; the shipped frontend hardcodes 3650”
The source says No source to compare with.
No source givenNumber
The frontend's "delete all" button deletes only normal tokens, leaving long-lived parent tokens and system tokens alive.
The article gives no link or citation for it.
The article says “the frontend’s own “delete all” button calls it for normal tokens only, keeping the current token, so the shipped UI’s bulk action leaves long-lived parents and system tokens alive”
The source says No source to compare with.
Also covered by
No other coverage was clustered with this story.
Elsewhere
Elsewhere: HN 3 pts, not on front page
Recorded for context only, checked 10 Nov 2026, 05:47 UTC. It played no part in the ranking.