Demudhra.sh, remove the leaked eMudhra certs from your machine
Comments on “Demudhra.sh, remove the leaked eMudhra certs from your machine”
Claim-checked. Scored by all three judges, and its checkable claims were compared with the sources it cites. How far stories are checked
Demudhra.sh is a script for Linux and macOS that finds and removes eight compromised eMudhra intermediate CA certificates, whose P-384 private keys can be trivially recovered, from system and application trust stores.
Why it ranked
No. 22 of 122 with a score of 0.70. The panel rated it highest on practical relevance (0.89) and technical depth (0.80), lowest on significance (0.61). Placed No. 22, No. 11 by score alone: the ninth Security story of the day (−0.080), and close to “Found 380 eMudhra-Linked Root Certificates on My Laptop”, No. 3 on Monday 16 November 2026 (−0.007). The placement terms move stories; they are not part of the score.
- AI judgeJudge 2claude-haiku-5-5
- Practical security tool addressing a real CA key compromise affecting trust stores; concrete technical detail and command output, but tool-centric with some promotional framing and limited independent verification of claims.
- AI judgeJudge 3gpt-5.6-luna
- A practical security remediation script addresses a real certificate compromise across system and developer trust stores, with implementation scope, safeguards, limitations, backup/undo behavior, and example output. It substantially overlaps prior eMudhra coverage but adds actionable tooling.
Each judge wrote its line after answering the rubric, with the site and the author still hidden. Every answer behind this is in the table under Score.
Score
0.70total under rubric v2.3
- Significance0.61
- Reader interest0.78
- Audience breadth0.66
- Practical relevance0.89
- Substantiated0.74
- Technical depth0.80
- New information0.75
- Counts against: Promotional0.11
- Counts against: Overclaim0.20
Each judge’s answer per question (0–1), their mean and spread, and what the question adds to the score (weight × mean).
| Question | Judge 1 | Judge 2 | Judge 3 | Mean | Spread | Weight | Contribution (weight times mean) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SignificanceHow much does this change what people in tech know or can do? | 0.69 | 0.55 | 0.58 | 0.61 | 0.14 | +0.24 | +0.146 |
| Reader interestWould a well-informed senior engineer or tech founder want to read this today, and likely pass it on? | 0.81 | 0.70 | 0.82 | 0.78 | 0.12 | +0.26 | +0.202 |
| Audience breadthHow many people who build technology does it concern? | 0.83 | 0.60 | 0.56 | 0.66 | 0.27 | +0.13 | +0.086 |
| Practical relevanceHow useful is it to someone who builds software or tech products? | 0.97 | 0.85 | 0.83 | 0.89 | 0.14 | +0.22 | +0.195 |
| SubstantiatedHow well is it backed? Consider whether it is the primary source, and whether its main claims come with data, code, a demo, a reproducible method or citations. | 0.88 | 0.60 | 0.73 | 0.74 | 0.28 | +0.05 | +0.037 |
| Technical depthHow technically substantive is it? | 0.96 | 0.75 | 0.68 | 0.80 | 0.28 | +0.05 | +0.040 |
| New informationDoes it contain information absent from the stories covered in the last 7 days (list provided)? | 0.77 | 0.70 | 0.78 | 0.75 | 0.08 | +0.05 | +0.038 |
| PromotionalIs it mainly marketing with little substance (a press release, ad or sponsored post with no real information)? A launch post that carries real news is not promotional. | 0.07 | 0.15 | 0.12 | 0.11 | 0.08 | −0.19 | −0.022 |
| OverclaimDo the headline or conclusions claim more than the body supports? | 0.22 | 0.30 | 0.08 | 0.20 | 0.22 | −0.11 | −0.022 |
| Sum of contributions | +0.699 | ||||||
| Claim-check penalty | 0.000 | ||||||
| Total, as published | 0.699 | ||||||
Spread is the highest minus the lowest judge answer. marks a spread above 0.40: the judges disagree, and the story is marked contested.
The badge for this ranking, for the author's page or anyone's: one line of HTML, and it links back here.
<a href="https://rubric.hrih.si/editions/2026-11-17/22/"><img src="https://rubric.hrih.si/badge/2026-11-17/22.svg" alt="Ranked #22 on Rubric, 17 Nov 2026" width="245" height="28"></a>Claim check
Claim check: 3 matches source · 5 couldn’t check. Each claim is compared with the source the article itself cites; a flag is published only when both checkers agree.
Matches sourceDate
In October 2026, eight eMudhra intermediate CAs were found to have P-384 private keys that were integers smaller than 256, so anyone can recover them near instantly.
The cited source says the same thing.
The article says “In October 2026, eight eMudhra intermediate CAs turned out to have P-384 private keys that were integers smaller than 256”
The source says “The 8 impacted keys all used integers less than 256. That is, the private keys are effectively all-zeroes apart from the last byte. They can be recovered near instantly”
Source cited by the article: bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi
Matches sourceNumber
Sectigo had cross-signed the same keys, making 16 certificates in total.
The cited source says the same thing.
The article says “Sectigo had cross-signed the same keys, so that's 16 certificates”
The source says “The Sectigo cross-signed certs are still unrevoked currently”
Source cited by the article: bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi
Matches sourceNumber
Within two days, over 100,000 certificates signed with these keys appeared in CT logs, mostly proof-of-concepts for google.com.
The cited source says the same thing.
The article says “Within two days, over 100,000 certificates signed with these keys showed up in CT logs, mostly proof-of-concepts for google.com”
The source says “Between 09:40 UTC on 20 October and 22:02 UTC on 21 October, 107,107 certificates signed with six of the eight keys were logged”
Source cited by the article: bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi
Couldn’t checkGeneralization
Chrome, Firefox and Apple's frameworks now block the compromised certificates.
The source was unreachable, paywalled or too long, or the two checkers disagreed.
The article says “Chrome, Firefox and Apple's frameworks block them now”
The source says No passage could be compared.
Source cited by the article: blog.google/security/protecting-chrome-and-android-users-from-compromised-emudhra-intermediate-ca-certificates
Couldn’t checkCausal conclusion
curl, git, python3 and other software that reads its own CA file can still accept the compromised certificates.
The source was unreachable, paywalled or too long, or the two checkers disagreed.
The article says “But curl, git, python3 and anything else that reads its own CA file can still accept them”
The source says No passage could be compared.
Source cited by the article: support.apple.com/en-us/149555
Couldn’t checkGeneralization
Apple's note tells admins to edit /etc/ssl/cert.pem, which curl, git, python3, ruby and openssl read.
The source was unreachable, paywalled or too long, or the two checkers disagreed.
The article says “etc/ssl/cert.pem, the file Apple's note tells admins to edit, which curl, git, python3, ruby and openssl read”
The source says No passage could be compared.
Source cited by the article: support.apple.com/en-us/149555
Couldn’t checkGeneralization
Apple lists Sectigo's AAA Certificate Services as an optional removal.
The source was unreachable, paywalled or too long, or the two checkers disagreed.
The article says “Sectigo's AAA Certificate Services, which Apple lists as optional”
The source says No passage could be compared.
Source cited by the article: support.apple.com/en-us/149555
Couldn’t checkGeneralization
Mozilla, Chrome and Apple have all pulled or blocked the emSign ECC Root CA - G3 root.
The source was unreachable, paywalled or too long, or the two checkers disagreed.
The article says “Mozilla, Chrome and Apple have all pulled or blocked that root”
The source says No passage could be compared.
Source cited by the article: bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi
Also covered by
No other coverage was clustered with this story.
Elsewhere
Elsewhere: HN 4 pts, not on front page
Recorded for context only, checked 17 Nov 2026, 05:47 UTC. It played no part in the ranking.